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Conventional accounts of expert authority frequently over-simplify relations between science 
and politics, and presume the existence of a singular ‘interface’ between these domains. In 
contrast, this paper draws on semi-structured interviews to document how the authority of UK 
Chief Scientific Advisers (CSAs) emerges from their engagement in the construction and 
bridging of several distinct but interrelated boundaries. Building on co-productionist accounts 
of science–policy ‘interactions’, the paper moreover contends that these various boundaries 
are themselves constituted within place-specific contexts. The locally-situated, material 
conditions of advice-giving, in short, fundamentally shape the hybridisation and mutual 
alignment of science and politics around specific governance objectives. Further analytical 
work on expert advisory processes and expert authority should, we contend, be more closely 
attuned to the roles played by discursive, social and material factors in facilitating boundary 
bridging and co-production in practice. 
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While we have become accustomed to calls for policy- and decision-making to be grounded 
in the best available scientific evidence, a growing body of scholarship on science–policy 
interactions, as mediated by expertise, has highlighted the complexity of such relationships in 
practice. Within this broad context, scholars across a wide range of disciplines have provided 
rich insights on expertise and advisory processes (for an overview, see Owens 2015, ch 1), 
drawing on diverse perspectives and developing important conceptual frameworks such as 
those of ‘boundary work’ (Gieryn 1983, 1995) and ‘co-production’ (Jasanoff 1990, 2004). 
Questions remain, however, about the mechanisms through which expert advice intersects 
with and comes to influence policy-making and politics—and a widely perceived loss of trust 
in expertise renders the search for answers all the more pressing (Jasanoff and Simmet 2017, 
Kennedy 2016, Nichols 2017). Recently, many scholars have also called for greater scrutiny 
of the day-to-day practices through which experts engage in boundary work in advisory 
settings, and of the locally situated and material circumstances of the co-production of 
science and politics (Le Heron 2009, Mahony 2013, Montana 2017, Palmer 2014). 
Taking up this latter challenge, our focus in this paper is on the specific case of expert 
advisory work undertaken by departmental Chief Scientific Advisers (CSAs) within UK 
government. The higher-level position of UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser (GCSA) 
has existed since 1964, when the zoologist Sir Solly (later Lord) Zuckerman was appointed to 
advise Harold Wilson’s government.2 Later, during Professor Sir John Beddington’s tenure as 
GCSA (2008–2013), CSAs were recruited across Whitehall, and by 2011 a CSA existed in 
                                                 
1 The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own, and should not be taken to represent the views of any 
organisations with which they are associated. 
2 The remit for the GCSA is to ensure the quality and use of scientific evidence and advice across government, 




every major government department.3 This proliferation forms part of a broader shift towards 
‘evidence-based policy-making’ in the UK, accelerated after the Labour Party’s general 
election victory in 1997 (Sanderson 2009). It also undoubtedly owes much to specifically 
British ideas about expertise, which—as Doubleday and Wilsdon (2012, 301) note—have 
long centred on “the credibility and character of the individual”. Even so, the CSA concept 
has been taken up in other contexts, including Australia and New Zealand, the devolved 
administrations of Wales and Scotland4, and was also in favour at the European Union level 
for a period from 20115. 
While CSAs represent just one of many institutional forms “through which experts 
influence decisions or policy carried out by others” (Turner 2014, 2), for several reasons they 
offer an ideal case for examining the day-to-day practices of scientific experts as they engage 
with the policy process. First, since this model of expert advice spans diverse sectors of UK 
policy, an enhanced understanding of its functioning should yield wide-ranging benefits. 
Second, since CSAs work inside government departments, they circulate within physical 
spaces of decision-making, and therefore permit a study of both discursive and material 
components of boundary work in practice. Third, focusing on CSAs allows us to examine the 
activities and experiences of individual expert advisers. Thus we seek to add to those existing 
studies whose focus has been on collectives of experts—committees, commissions and other 
                                                 
3 At the time of writing (April 2018), three CSA posts are vacant, and one department has no CSA. Details of 
incumbent CSAs can be found at: http://www.bis.gov.uk/go-science/science-in-government/chief-scientific-
advisers [accessed 26th April 2018]. 
4 Prior to the collapse of its devolved government in January 2017, there were also plans to recruit a Chief 
Scientific Adviser for Northern Ireland. 
5 The European Commission abolished the post of Chief Scientific Adviser in 2014. While a discussion of the 
circumstances surrounding this decision is beyond the scope of this paper, it nonetheless underlines that there is 




bodies with advisory functions—often institutionally situated outside, or at arm’s length 
from, government (Bijker et al. 2009; Hilgartner 2000; Jasanoff 1990; Owens 2015). 
The analysis that follows draws on semi-structured interviews with former and 
incumbent CSAs to address two inter-related questions: how do CSAs gain access to 
Ministers and other key decision makers within Whitehall; and how do these advisers, and 
other actors within government, understand and represent the processes by which advice 
comes to have effect? While we consider how our interviewees explain the cultivation of 
‘influence’, the actual nature and extent of CSAs’ impacts are outside this paper’s remit.6 It is 
worth noting, nevertheless, that CSAs in government have sometimes had significant effects 
on the course of events; see, for example, Dunlop (2010) on the role of CSAs in the evolution 
of biofuels policy, and Cassidy (2015) and Dunlop (2017) on the interventions of GCSAs in 
the long-running controversy over badgers and bovine tuberculosis. 
The next section begins by reviewing previous accounts of relationships between 
expertise and policy processes, suggesting that insights can be gained from more explicit 
consideration of material factors involved in boundary work and co-production. Section three 
outlines the research design and methods for this study, before section four presents key 
findings. The final section draws out wider implications for theories of policy advice.7 
2. Science and policy: From ‘interface’ to co-production 
                                                 
6 The nature of expert influence in policy processes is not always self-evident. In her long-term study of the UK 
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, for example, Owens (2015) identifies a spectrum, or 
continuum, of many different kinds of effects that expert advice can have, including those which are rapid and 
visible, gradual and diffuse, or negligible, depending on context.  
7 Whilst social scientific expertise, currently under-represented in the UK’s scientific advisory system (with the 
exception of economics), is worthy of further study, its role is beyond the scope of this paper. See Kattirtzi 




2.1 The fallacy of a singular science–policy ‘interface’ 
While the elicitation of scientific advice from specially recruited individuals is not novel in 
UK policy making—during World War II for example, Winston Churchill routinely sought 
scientific advice from physicist Frederick Alexander Lindemann—formal government 
guidelines on the use of scientific advice date back only to 1997. According to those 
guidelines, CSAs—usually recruited directly from the academic community—are charged 
with ensuring that “robust, joined-up evidence is at the core of decisions within departments 
and across government” (GOScience 2010, 12). This objective is to be pursued “both through 
offering advice directly to Ministers and official colleagues, and by oversight of processes for 
ensuring that departments take account of, and commission where appropriate, relevant 
scientific and engineering evidence” (GOScience 2015, 6). 
 Official descriptions of the CSA’s role evoke models of science–policy interactions in 
which experts facilitate one-way, linear flows of knowledge from researchers to decision 
makers. Under this reading, “experts who inform the policy process enjoy a kind of 
‘numinous legitimacy’, conferred by their ... scientific authority; values and judgements 
remain firmly the prerogative of the decision makers whom they advise” (Owens 2005, 288).8 
Such ‘technical–rational’ (Owens 2005) or ‘linear–autonomy’ (Jasanoff 2011a) models view 
science and politics as mutually exclusive, and in science–policy discourse this idea is often 
extended to imply that scientific evidence in itself will be able to resolve policy controversies 
(see Pielke [2007] for an interesting discussion). Moreover, in stipulating a benchmark of 
‘robust, joined-up evidence’, the guidelines tacitly reinforce the assumption that expert 
advice is “most useful to policy when it is presented as a single, ‘definitive’ interpretation” 
(Stirling 2010, 1029), rather than in a manner that emphasises areas of potential disagreement 
or uncertainty (see Sarewitz 2011 for a discussion). 
                                                 




Although the ‘technical–rational’ representation has proved tenacious, in practice 
“[l]ittle about this model is not misleading …” (Turner 2014: 4). Research in the policy and 
political sciences, for example, has long served to undermine the view that science simply 
“provides the ‘facts’ for policy makers to use” (Forsyth 2003, 233; see also Collingridge and 
Reeve 1986; Price 1965). Not only can knowledge and advice be deployed (or interpreted) 
strategically—even Churchill’s wartime adviser, Lindemann, was renowned for tailoring 
advice to “provide rationales for whichever course the prime minister… wished to follow” 
(Mukerjee 2010, 42)—but the technical and scientific tools used in knowledge production 
may themselves embody normative presuppositions about the nature of the issue(s) being 
addressed (Flyvbjerg 1997; Nelkin 1975; Owens and Cowell 2011; Palmer 2016). 
Interpretive policy analysts, meanwhile, have identified the cognitive schema used by various 
actors to make sense of complex policy problems—whether in the form of frames, 
discourses, storylines, or otherwise—emphasising the hybridisation of ‘facts’ with ‘values’ 
(Hajer 1995; Palmer 2010; Schön and Rein 1994). Collectively, such work has challenged 
conceptions of a sharp science–policy ‘interface’ across which knowledge is 
straightforwardly transmitted, highlighting a messier reality in which the boundary between 
the two spheres is neither fixed nor pre-determined. 
2.2 Navigating hybridity: constructing and bridging boundaries 
Faced with these complexities, expert advisers have been shown to cultivate and preserve 
authority for scientific knowledge claims by engaging in ‘boundary work’ (Gieryn 1983; 
Guston 2001; Jasanoff 1987). Defined as attributing “selected characteristics to the institution 
of science… for purposes of constructing a social boundary that distinguishes some 
intellectual activities as ‘non-science’” (Gieryn 1983, 782), the concept of boundary work 




the processes through which certain knowledge claims come to be perceived as rigorous and 
objective, whilst others do not. 
 At the same time, however, and especially in relation to complex controversies, the 
legitimacy of scientific knowledge claims comes to depend less on their being perceived as 
rigorous and objective, and increasingly on their sensitivity and responsiveness to social and 
political contexts (Callon et al. 2009, Nowotny et al. 2001). Conventional risk assessment has 
long been criticised for being hubristic and yet poorly equipped to embrace ‘deep’ 
uncertainties (Stirling 2003), and science and technology studies scholars have built upon the 
concept of boundary work to argue that in such contexts experts and decision makers engage 
in a range of boundary-type activities, including the production of judgements. Thus, for 
Jasanoff (2005a, 211), the question “is no longer which scientific assessments are right, or 
even more technically defensible, but whose recommendations the public should accept as 
credible and authoritative.” 
While the necessity of good judgement in the face of complex policy problems has 
been widely acknowledged (see, for example, RCEP 1984, 1998; Weinberg 1972), there is 
less agreement about its relationship with ‘the facts’. Collins and Evans (2010, 186), for 
example, advocate separation of a ‘technical’ from a ‘political’ phase of what they term 
“technological decision-making in the public domain” (seeing such separation as feasible and 
desirable). But others contest the presumption that facts and values can readily be 
disentangled in this way in complex science–policy issues (Ezrahi 1980; Fischer 2011; 
Owens 2011b). From the latter perspective, technical advice can rarely, perhaps never, be 
produced in the absence of normative judgements about the wider public meanings of an 
issue. Indeed, technical assessments—ostensibly neutral and objective—may in practice 
prescribe wider public meaning, by presuming both the relevance to the assessment of 




techniques for their measurement (Shrader-Frechette 1995; Wynne 1992). Where CSAs are 
concerned, this implies that policy influence might derive not from the ability to impose a 
hard distinction between science and non-science (as in Gieryn’s [1983] account of boundary 
work), but rather from an ability to bridge boundaries by making judgements about 
competing knowledge claims whose relative value is at least partly obscured by prevailing 
risks and uncertainties.  
 Recent studies of expert advisory bodies have added weight to these arguments, 
drawing attention to the purposeful production of advice combining scientific knowledge 
with judgements about the social context within which that knowledge is produced and 
applied. In her long-term analysis of the UK Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 
Owens (2015, 166) finds that the Commission’s deliberations were less akin “to any 
technically oriented appraisal of ‘the facts’” than to what Weale (2010, 266) terms “practical 
public reasoning”. Similarly, Bijker et al.’s (2009, 142) analysis of the Gezondheidsraad (the 
Health Council of the Netherlands) highlights the presence in this body’s reports of what the 
authors term “wisdom”, defined as a “well argued reflection on the state of knowledge in 
relation to the state of the world”.  
To retain their authority, however, such institutions must also reinforce widely 
perceived boundaries between science and non-science, even as they offer advice 
transcending the perceived dichotomy between facts and values. This they achieve through 
rhetorical, social and material techniques, with the latter including the design of committee 
procedures, the choice of members, or simply the norms and conditions of committee work. 
The claim that knowledge production is underpinned by social and material techniques is not 
new, of course; Shapin and Schaffer (1985, 25) drew attention to the interconnected role of 
material, literary and social technologies “employed in fact-making” in their historical 




different role in the expert advisory processes of the 21st century than they did in authorising 
the findings of 17th century natural philosophy experiments. Specifically, by reinforcing the 
perception of science and politics as mutually exclusive spheres, such techniques preserve an 
expert advisory body’s licence to give advice, even as the substance of that advice bridges 
boundaries, contributing to the co-production of knowledge and policy (Bijker et al. 2009; 
Jasanoff 2004; Owens 2011a, 2015; Turnpenny et al., 2013). 
2.3. Venues, sites, rooms, and spaces 
By highlighting the social and material dimensions of the boundary bridging activities in 
which advisory bodies engage, recent studies raise additional questions for scholars of co-
production, notably concerning the ways in which such activities are shaped by their 
situatedness in particular venues, sites, rooms and spaces. Research in geographies of science 
has long contended that knowledge does not simply unfurl across space; rather, in 
encountering new places and cultures, scientific ideas can be reinterpreted or remoulded to 
suit local contexts. Thus Livingstone (2015), for example, documents how various 
Presbyterian communities in Britain and North America engaged with Darwin’s theory of 
evolution, arguing that in each case a unique “speech space” was created, permitting the 
articulation of certain arguments but not others. 
 In the field of interpretive policy analysis, Hajer’s (2005) dramaturgical approach to 
policy deliberations contends that persuasiveness and influence are not exclusively cognitive 
entities, because “sustainable persuasion is often enacted” (Hajer and Versteeg 2005, 344). 
From this perspective, and in a manner that applies to all policy actors, including expert 
advisers, “what is said, how it can be said, what it is possible to say, and what can be said 
with effect are all influenced by setting” (Campbell et al. 2014, 6). More recently, Pallett and 
Chilvers’ (2015, 150) offer a view of organisations at the science–policy ‘interface’ 




 Reflecting a broader trend for social scientists to (re)turn to questions of materiality 
(Whatmore 2006), such conceptual approaches have informed studies of boundary work and 
co-production in numerous settings, including, for example, debates about sustainable growth 
in New Zealand (Le Heron 2009), international climate change negotiations (Mahony 2013), 
EU biofuels policy (Palmer 2014), and deliberations of the Intergovernmental Platform on 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (Montana 2017). In all these studies, attention to 
ostensibly banal variables such as room layouts, seating arrangements, and the regulation of 
access to meeting rooms, has shown how “local acts of constant co-production and mutual 
realignment” of science and policy are materially grounded in what might be termed 
“boundary spaces” (Mahony 2013, 37). 
Whilst the research outlined above has begun to illuminate the role of context-
specific, material factors in shaping processes of co-production, much of the work on 
advisory institutions to date has focused on the discursive and argumentative strategies used 
by experts when communicating their advice (as in Pielke’s [2007] framework, for example), 
and often, as noted above, on the practices of expert advisory bodies positioned outside of 
government (Bijker et al. 2009; Hilgartner 2000; Jasanoff 1990; Owens 2015)9. This paper, 
building on the insights of previous work, adds a further dimension by focusing on individual 
advisers working inside government. We examine how the role and influence of departmental 
CSAs has been understood by CSAs themselves and by those with whom they interact, and 
how CSAs, in seeking to ensure that their advice has effect, engage in processes of boundary 
construction and boundary bridging. We also consider the extent to which such boundary 
                                                 
9 Studies of advisory processes operating ‘within’ government do exist, but have tended to focus on collective 
bodies rather than individuals. Scholars have for instance examined the influence of UK Parliamentary select 
committees (Turnpenny et al. 2013, Williams 1993), and the White House Office of Science and Technology 




activities are constituted by materially-grounded practices within specific spaces of decision 
making in Whitehall. Before presenting our analysis, however, it is necessary to outline the 
data sources and methodology. 
3. Research Materials 
Interviewees for this study were identified using purposive sampling, drawing on the 
established (formal and informal) networks of the University of Cambridge’s Centre for 
Science and Policy (CSaP)10. Criteria for selection centred on individuals’ ability to provide 
direct accounts of serving as, or working alongside, a CSA, with the aim of including 
individuals whose combined experience spanned multiple government departments at various 
times during the period 1980–2012. These criteria generated an initial sample comprising 
twenty former CSAs, four GCSAs, two former members of governmental advisory 
committees, and four former senior civil servants (including a cabinet secretary and a deputy 
CSA). Of these thirty individuals, sixteen, including ten former and incumbent departmental 
CSAs and two former GCSAs, accepted the request for an interview. Four interviewees had 
taken up their posts in the period 1980–1994; six in the period 1995–2004; and six in the 
period 2005–2012. In the interviews themselves, which lasted between 40 and 90 minutes, 
respondents were encouraged to reflect on the day-to-day realities of working at the 
interstices of science and politics, and to reflect on the factors—whether interpersonal, 
political, practical or otherwise—that they felt had made a significant contribution to the 
success (or failure) of their efforts to deliver influential advice. A semi-structured format was 
adopted so that the same themes could be explored in each interview, while allowing scope 
for interviewees to introduce novel ideas based on their personal perspectives or experiences. 
                                                 
10 CSaP was founded in 2009, aiming to build relationships between policy professionals and academics. Since 
2011, its Policy Fellowship scheme has brought over 200 policy makers to Cambridge for meetings with over 




Due to the sensitive nature of the advisory and political processes discussed, steps have been 
taken to protect anonymity, with quotes being attributed to identifiers according to 




I1 Former GCSA 
1980-1994 I2, I3 Former departmental CSAs 
I4 Former governmental advisory committee member 
I5 Former GCSA 
1995-2004 I6, I7, I8, I9 Former departmental CSAs 
I10 Former senior civil servant 
I11 Former departmental CSA 
2005-2012 
I12, I13, I14 
Incumbent departmental CSAs (at time of 
interview) 
I15, I16 
Incumbent senior civil servants (at time of 
interview) 
Table 1: Interviewee identifiers, posts and periods of commencement 
 
Interviews were complemented by analysis of documents, selected on the grounds 
that they had been identified by the majority of our interviewees as playing a key role in the 
evolution of the CSA concept in the UK. Specifically, these documents included government 
guidelines on the use of scientific advice in policy making;11 a cross-cutting review of 
science and research in government, undertaken jointly by four Whitehall institutions (Her 
Majesty’s Treasury [HMT], Department for Education and Skills [DES], Office of Science 
and Technology [OST], Department of Trade and Industry [DTI] 2002); and a report on the 
role and functions of departmental CSAs by the House of Lords Science and Technology 
                                                 
11 Four versions of these guidelines exist. The first (OST 1997) was issued by Lord May during his term as 
GCSA. Updated versions were twice issued during the tenure of Sir David King (OST 2000, 2005), and then 




Committee (HoLSTC 2012), including oral and written evidence. These sources provided 
valuable additional material against which to compare interviewees’ contentions, whilst 
affording insights into conceptions of CSAs within the wider policy community. 
4. Working with the grain? Gaining access, giving ‘good advice’ 
4.1 Scientific standing, rapport and materiality  
In government documentation and other published reports, CSAs’ standing and experience as 
practising scientists frequently emerge as important signifiers of their epistemic authority, 
and therefore their credibility in Whitehall.12 The 2002 multi-departmental review of the use 
of science and research in government, for instance, contends that CSAs “need active 
experience at the cutting edge of science, in order to ensure that they have appropriate 
credibility both within and outside [their] department” (HMT et al. 2002, 89). The House of 
Lords Science and Technology Committee similarly argues that CSAs “must have standing 
and authority within the scientific community, nationally and internationally” (HoLSTC 
2012, 22). Several interviewees added weight to this perspective, for example: 
“The strength of the CSAs, in my view, is having somebody who comes from outside 
and has a fresh view, who’s got one foot in universities or research institutes, is doing 
research, is very active in [national] academies…” (I13, Interview, 21st June 2012). 
In these accounts, CSAs’ standing as recognised practising scientists is taken as an indicator 
of their ability to offer objective, dispassionate advice and, by extension, of their 
independence from government. The presumption of a link between independence and 
credibility is consistent with wider institutional frameworks for utilising scientific advice in 
                                                 
12 For Quack (2016, 363), it is through claims to epistemic authority that “individuals or groups attempt to 
convert their specific knowledge into expertise as a type of knowledge that stands out from other, more 




UK policy making—successive guidelines have reiterated the importance of independence, 
whether advice is “provided by eminent individuals, learned societies, advisory committees, 
or consultants” (OST 1997: 4).13 But characteristics like disinterestedness, independence, 
credibility, and trustworthiness, while frequently invoked, are far from unambiguous or 
straightforward to define (Owens 2015, Withers 2017); we return to this point in Section 5. 
Calls for the wider recruitment of CSAs across multiple government departments, 
which took on particular urgency following the 2001 ‘foot and mouth’ outbreak, depicted a 
need not only for independent expert advice, but also a more efficient means of accessing it, 
especially in ‘crisis’ situations. Following criticism of the government’s handling of ‘foot and 
mouth’—an outbreak that precipitated the slaughter of nearly four million animals 
(Fergusson et al. 2001)—public trust in policy makers was severely damaged (Poortinga et 
al. 2010). This episode compounded the impact of the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 
(BSE) “fiasco” (HoLSTC 2000, para 1.1) of the 1990s, in which policy makers had sought, 
erroneously, to reassure the public that infected beef, if properly cooked, posed no risk to 
human health. In this context, the recruitment of CSAs was interpreted by many interviewees 
as an effective means of securing expert advice when rapid, decisive action was required to 
address an urgent or unforeseen problem. One senior civil servant viewed CSAs as an 
“immensely powerful” means of improving “the way in which people look on particularly 
controversial decisions” (I15, Interview, 4th May 2012), whilst a former CSA remarked that 
“the big crises point to a need for really high-level independent scientific advice” (I8, 
Interview, 20th June 2012). 
                                                 
13 One manifestation of this concern is the insistence on documenting individuals’ ‘interests’, though the 
emphasis in such declarations tends to be on financial or institutional arrangements that might give rise to a real 




These perspectives, while revealing, are confined to circumstances in which policy 
makers proactively seek advice from CSAs. They say little, by contrast, about processes 
through which CSAs might challenge policy makers, either by questioning the evidence base 
underpinning proposed decisions, or by identifying emergent problems requiring political 
attention. These more unsolicited forms of advice raise the question of how CSAs gain access 
to key decision makers in Whitehall.14 Here, accounts varied markedly amongst our 
interviewees, but in all cases recognised that independence and scientific standing, whilst 
necessary, were not sufficient in themselves. 
The construction of good working, and indeed social, relationships with civil 
servants—and not only those in senior positions—was frequently invoked by interviewees as 
key to facilitating access to high-level decision makers, as in the following observation from 
a former CSA: 
“The first relations that were extremely important to deal with… would not be with 
[senior figures], but with the people who reported to them, so it was very important 
that these people passed the word down the line, “the CSA is OK”.” (I2, Interview, 
22nd June 2012). 
Another was more pragmatic and straightforward: 
“How in hell do [CSAs] get [their advice] heard?… In Whitehall, having a budget is 
power. If they don’t have a budget, they lack power, and therefore in essence, it 
entirely relates to their personal relationship with the ministers.” (I7, Interview, 9th 
May 2012). 
                                                 
14 The House of Lords Science and Technology Committee recommends that CSAs “should have a right of 




Without downplaying the importance of CSAs’ perceived independence, or indeed their 
ability to command and discharge a research budget,15 these accounts depict the advisory 
landscape as simultaneously professional and social, thereby recognising the need for CSAs 
to bridge a boundary between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ in government. Doing so entails day-
to-day work, as CSAs seek to establish rapport with civil servants and ministers, but also 
hinges on the extent to which they demonstrate a willingness to commit to their role full-
time. In this respect, some interviewees contradicted the House of Lords Science and 
Technology Committee’s view that CSAs should be employed part-time, while remaining 
active in scientific research. An incumbent CSA, for instance, remarked: 
“People seem to maintain both an academic and a civil service career and I think 
that’s actually quite difficult and almost disingenuous. I think… you come in and you 
take it seriously and it’s your full-time commitment.” (I14, Interview, 21st June 
2012). 
In emphasising the need to be regarded by government officials as an ‘insider’, some CSAs 
therefore advocated suspending the very scientific research activities upon which their 
perceived independence was predicated. Even as CSAs’ scientific standing and independence 
from government are routinely pinpointed (both in government guidelines and by CSAs 
themselves) as important sources of credibility, therefore, the boundary between austere 
technical analysis and congenial personal relations frequently becomes blurred in practice. 
Not all interviewees, however, singled out personal relations as vital to a CSA’s 
ability to gain access to decision makers. One former CSA remarked: 
                                                 
15 It was not possible, in our interviews, to obtain reliable information on the fiscal or budgetary dimensions of 
CSAs’ responsibilities. Nonetheless, this study’s focus on more situated, day-to-day practices used by CSAs to 
gain credibility and deliver advice within Whitehall, should not be read as a dismissal of the importance of what 




“I think it’s very appropriate that these sorts of governance issues, to do with 
evidence and scrutiny and analysis, are independent of the personalities.” (I11, 
Interview, 10th May 2012, emphasis added). 
Yet when prompted to reflect on why (in his own assessment) he hadn’t achieved certain 
objectives as a CSA, even this individual conceded that personalities had made a difference: 
“Part of it may be to do with me, I waited to be invited, others were more forceful 
about their interventions and as it were, knocked the door down.” (I11, Interview, 10th 
May 2012). 
This last quote also hints at a further set of practices used by CSAs to gain access to 
decision makers, predicated on actively creating opportunities to engage in advisory 
interactions, beyond those offered by formal departmental procedures. The reflections of 
another former CSA epitomise this approach: 
“The [Minister’s] outer office is very, very good at keeping people away… But I had 
a trick… called the elevator pitch16… I used to lurk at the elevator, at the bottom, and 
wait for a minister to come and jump in… and as we’re going up say “oh minister do 
you know such-and-such”?” (I9, Interview, 29th May 2012). 
Similarly, a former GCSA recounted how he: 
“… used to quite frankly have to go in the back door to Number 10 [Downing Street] 
because the Cabinet Secretary says “Oh, the Prime Minister’s far too busy to be 
interested in science”.” (I1, Interview, 22nd June 2012). 
In these examples, the ostensibly banal characteristics of the spaces within which decision 
makers and CSAs circulate—including for instance the positioning of lifts, doorways, and 
                                                 
16 An ‘elevator pitch’ comprises a compelling synopsis of a proposal or idea, delivered in a very constrained 
period of time. While accounts differ about the origins of the concept, it is often associated with venture 




Ministers’ ‘outer offices’—are imbued with creative potential, serving as material artefacts 
that might be used to bring about unscheduled, face-to-face advisory interactions. But the 
characteristics of these spaces could also act, in the opposite vein, to constrain a CSA’s 
access to decision makers, as in the following example: 
“For the first half of the time I was largely ignored; I was given an office and a PA. 
The Chief Economist would walk past regularly, he had a much grander office than 
me, and would just carry on doing things as though I wasn’t there.” (I9, Interview, 
29th May 2012). 
Here the material character of the CSA’s office—not as ‘grand’ as that of another prominent 
adviser, and situated such that it could easily be bypassed—emerge as partly constitutive of 
this individual’s perceived lack of influence within the department. Collectively, these 
accounts suggest that the spaces within which CSAs and policy makers circulate cannot be 
relegated to the role of a ‘passive’ backdrop for social and discursive interactions (Pallett and 
Chilvers 2015: 153). Instead, material artefacts within those spaces convey affordances 
(Ingold 1992), making themselves available to certain uses while constraining others, thereby 
influencing the extent—and the nature—of advisory encounters themselves. 
Overall, these accounts suggest that CSAs routinely engage in boundary bridging 
activities as part of their day-to-day engagement with decision makers, and that these 
activities are underpinned by both social and material practices. They enable CSAs to 
progress from an ‘outsider’ role, as a dispassionate scientist-cum-expert, to that of an 
‘insider’, as a familiar, full-time colleague, and also to generate opportunities for face-to-face 
interactions outside of formal meetings or other routinised settings. At the same time, 
government guidelines and many CSAs themselves rhetorically reinforce the notion of a 
sharp boundary between science and politics, specifically by emphasising the scientific 




boundary construction and bridging activities therefore differs subtly from that observed in 
Bijker et al.’s (2009) study of the Gezondheidsraad. Here, social and material processes 
intrinsic to the day-to-day activities of the Gezondheidsraad served predominantly to 
reinforce its perceived independence (and thereby its authority), whilst the rhetorical 
substance of its published reports hybridised scientific and political considerations into a 
form of ‘wisdom’. 
4.2 Stage management, hybridisation and collaboration 
Whilst the previous section suggests that a CSA’s influence is “enormously a matter of the 
chemistry between that individual and the other senior people” (I2, Interview, 22nd June 
2012), it does not address the question of what makes advice effective in practice. We now 
go on to illuminate two further dimensions of a CSA’s activities—concerning the processes 
by which advice is delivered on the one hand, and the substance of that advice on the other—
which emerged from the accounts of interviewees as important determinants of effectiveness. 
These activities, too, can usefully be conceptualised as forms of boundary construction and 
bridging.  
In trying to pinpoint the hallmarks of effective advice, interviewees often spoke of the 
degree of transparency enacted around its delivery and use in policy making. Guidelines have 
advocated transparency in advisory practices since their first iteration (OST 1997), with the 
2010 version (the most recent at the time of writing) urging policy makers to “explain 
publicly the reasons for policy decisions, particularly where the decision appears to be 
inconsistent with scientific advice” (GOScience 2010, 10). Perhaps understandably therefore, 
interviewees who commenced their roles during the first period covered in this study (1980-
1994), prior to the publication of formal guidelines on the use of scientific advice, felt that 
the CSA’s role had shifted from a “low key”, private one, to one centred on “the openness of 




trouble interviewees, given that most thought it unlikely that deep disagreement or conflict 
would develop between a CSA and a policy maker in the first place. Indeed, interviewees 
were very measured when accounting for the significance accorded to their advice within the 
wider context of the policy process, recognising that “there is … a gap as to what [the 
scientific position] turns into in policy terms” (I16, Interview, 25th July 2012). At the same 
time, the increased emphasis on transparency sits uncomfortably with a desire on the part of 
many interviewees to reserve at least some of their interactions with decision makers for 
more private settings: 
“I still believe if you are given a job, you advise on a very private and confidential 
basis.” (I1, Interview, 22nd June 2012). 
“If the guidelines are about saying it the way it is without fear or favour, that’s fine; if 
the guidelines say you have to do that publicly, that isn’t going to work.” (I14, 
Interview, 21st June 2012).   
These extracts evoke Hilgartner’s (2000, 42) concept of stage management, suggesting that 
the quality of ‘good advice’ derives at least in part from a CSA’s negotiation of the boundary 
between what might be thought of as ‘backstage’, private interactions on the one hand, and 
‘front stage’, public declarations about those interactions on the other.  Moreover, they also 
suggest that the substance of interactions between scientific advice and other considerations 
in policy making should not be disclosed to wider public audiences even where disagreement 
is absent. In this sense, our interviewees effectively contend that the quality of advisory 
processes will be compromised if any party involved—either the CSA or the decision 
maker(s) in question—cannot be certain of the privacy of their exchanges. 
This in turn hints at a second dimension of ‘good advice’ identified by our 
interviewees, relating not to the question of transparency, but to the substance of advisory 




associated with the adoption of a constructive, open approach in which provisional ideas 
about the relationships between scientific evidence and other policy relevant considerations 
would, of necessity, have to be developed collaboratively and iteratively. For example, for 
one CSA: 
“The job consists of… actually explaining the scientific position, understanding it, but 
working with the grain.” (I14, Interview, 21st June 2012, emphasis added). 
The same interviewee went on to reject the view that effective advice should ever have to be 
underpinned by an adversarial challenge to the will of policy makers: 
“A lot of the challenge is to say, ‘I don’t think that’s quite the way we should be 
going and I’d suggest that we do it in such and such a way’… Seeing that as an 
adversarial challenge is nonsense… I’ve done it by explaining things, by gaining their 
trust and so on.” (I14, Interview, 21st June 2012). 
The CSA in these examples depicts the task of giving ‘good advice’ not simply as 
transmitting scientific knowledge, but as elucidating how that knowledge sits within a 
broader context of competing value judgements and worldviews. Within Pielke’s (2007, 17) 
typology of idealised roles for scientific advisers, the CSA serves here as an “honest broker 
of policy alternatives”, seeking to “place scientific understandings in the context of a 
smorgasbord of policy options”. Reflecting on the implications of uncertainty in complex 
policy debates, a former CSA similarly described ‘good advice’ as argumentative and 
contextual: 
“It was more to do with how you construct arguments in the face of uncertainty, 
which has now become very important for CSAs in general because uncertainty about 
data, uncertainty about the analysis and yet politicians wanting to make definitive 





Taken together, these insights suggest that in seeking to give ‘good advice’, CSAs recognise 
that it is necessary not only to work collaboratively with policy makers, but also to tailor 
arguments to what Jasanoff (2011b, 131) calls “contexts of interpretation”. These contexts of 
interpretation will, to a considerable extent, be shaped by ‘civic epistemologies’—defined as 
broad, culturally-specific “understandings of what credible [knowledge] claims should look 
like and how they ought to be articulated, represented, and defended” (Jasanoff 2005b: 249). 
But in the context of expert advisory processes, they will also—we contend—be influenced 
by more transient and situated factors, including the prevailing political climate within which 
advisory interactions take place, the specific characteristics of the policy problem(s) 
discussed, and the balance of interests amongst relevant stakeholders and wider publics. 
Consequently, especially under conditions of uncertainty and what Funtowicz and Ravetz 
(1993, 739) term high “decision stakes”, for advisers to invoke the intrinsic substance of 
supposedly objective facts—whether to support or oppose particular policy proposals—is 
unhelpful. Instead, there is a necessity to work with policy makers to formulate arguments 
which have been tailored to “the performative and persuasive demands of reasoning” 
(Jasanoff 2011b: 131) within a situated ‘context of interpretation’.  
In describing how they formulated such arguments in practice, moreover, CSAs 
recognised the importance of both social and material conditions in facilitating the cultivation 
of sufficiently collaborative and iterative interactions. The following extract from an 
interview with an ex-departmental CSA, recounting his interactions with a minister over a 
particularly complex policy issue, is insightful in this regard:  
“I sat with [the minister] for about four hours and tried to work through a sensible 
situation in the face of uncertainty... Our data sources were… wet finger in the air at 
best and yet we got ourselves into a policy trajectory where we needed to be able to 




and when version 18 was produced we were comfortable that [the minister] was 
going to say something that was… built on good analytic evidence and projected the 
right level of uncertainty…” (I11, Interview, 10th May 2012, emphasis added) 
In acknowledging that the argumentative basis for a specific policy trajectory was effectively 
co-constructed in this case, this CSA clearly aligns with calls for “stronger processes of 
mediation and translation [to be] woven into the processes of knowledge making itself” 
(Jasanoff 2011b, 141). However, in emphasising the length, intensity, and painstaking nature 
of the interactions required to ‘craft’ this minister’s speech, the quote also implies that such 
processes are best facilitated by sustained, face-to-face deliberation. Put differently, being in 
the same room—and taking the time to sit down together—significantly enhances the ability 
of the CSA and the relevant minister to work through the issues in question. A series of 
briefer, more rushed interactions, especially if not conducted face-to-face, would not permit 
the same level of constructive hybridisation between scientific knowledge and its “contexts 
of interpretation” (ibid., 131). 
Overall, this section suggests that CSAs foster mediation and translation in 
knowledge-making not only rhetorically (for example by producing independent reports) but 
also through a combination of particular social and material practices. They frequently adopt 
a collaborative, iterative approach to the process of formulating advice, and engage closely 
with decision makers on a sustained, face-to-face basis—in both cases building processes of 
mediation and translation into the substance of their advisory work. As in Bijker et al.’s 
(2009) study of the Gezondheidsraad, ‘good advice’ can therefore be said to constitute the 
purposeful hybridisation of science and politics. In this case, however, the techniques 
employed in boundary bridging, like those used to facilitate access to decision makers in the 






This paper has examined how CSAs gain access to, and build trust with, policy makers, as 
well as the characteristics that advisers and others working at the boundaries between science 
and policy ascribe to ‘good advice’. At a general level, there was broad support among our 
interviewees for the CSA model of institutionalising expert advice. All agreed that CSAs 
could have positive impacts upon public policy, if given sufficient fiscal and administrative 
support in Whitehall. Altogether more nuanced accounts emerged, however, when 
interviewees were asked to delineate the precise responsibilities of a CSA, and to reflect on 
the day-to-day nature of their work in practice.  
 Formal accounts of the responsibilities of CSAs largely reinforce a technical–rational 
view of a singular science–policy ‘interface’, wherein facts and values can, and should, be 
kept separate. From this perspective, the independence and disinterestedness of expert advice 
is crucial; a CSA’s standing within the scientific community then transmits into credibility, 
trust and influence within the (separate) political sphere. Our analysis shows, however, that 
for individual advisers (as for external advisory bodies), the reality is more complex, with 
characteristics like ‘independence’ and ‘disinterestedness’ frequently being inferred as much 
from the ways in which advice is delivered as from the credentials, experience or institutional 
background of the adviser. In this sense, our study of CSAs reinforces Withers’ (2017, 13) 
claim that trust and credibility “are negotiated outcomes borne of particular individual 
relationships, institutional settings and social connections”, rather than fixed dispositions.   
 These conclusions, based on a relatively small number of interviews with actors 
operating exclusively in the UK context, can be neither definitive nor exhaustive. But if we 
accept the proposition that each CSA adopts a unique approach to their job, we can go further 
to suggest that expertise itself—in the advisory context at least—is always a contingent, 




fields. Rather it is to argue that the perceived legitimacy and effectiveness of CSAs’ advice 
derives not only from its intrinsic properties—that is, the combination of evidence, argument 
and persuasion that it comprises (Majone 1989)—but also from the approach taken by the 
CSAs to constructing and managing boundaries of various kinds. These boundaries, 
moreover, transcend any singular ‘interface’ between science and politics. Instead, the 
analysis presented in this paper suggests that at least four boundaries, distinct but interrelated, 
constitute the terrain within which interactions between science and policy occur.  
 The first two concern not the substance of advice itself, but the processes by which 
CSAs establish relationships with, and consequently gain access to, decision makers. First, 
CSAs must make judgements about how to navigate a social boundary between ‘insiders’ and 
‘outsiders’ in Whitehall, both in the tenor of their day-to-day interactions with civil servants 
and ministers, and through the level of commitment they demonstrate towards the role (one 
presumption being that CSAs must work full-time to count as genuine ‘insiders’). Second, 
CSAs must navigate a closely-related boundary between formal, procedural interactions with 
decision makers on the one hand, and informal, spontaneous interactions on the other. This 
latter boundary can sometimes be actively bridged by a CSA’s careful manipulation of social 
and material factors, as in the case of the ‘elevator pitch’, for example. However, the 
affordances of the material spaces in which advisers engage with decision makers are not 
limitless; ‘outer offices’ can deny access at critical moments, much as CSAs’ chances of 
bumping into key figures can be diminished by the physical placement of their offices within 
the department. In this sense, the means of keeping experts ‘on tap, but not on top’ are not 
confined to formal rules set out in official guidelines; they also include apparently banal, 
material aspects of the corridors of Whitehall themselves. 
 The third and fourth boundaries identified in this study concern the practices by which 




separates ‘front stage’, public pronouncements about the outputs of interactions between 
CSAs and decision makers from the substance of their ‘backstage’, private deliberations. 
CSAs’ management of this boundary enables outcomes of advisory interactions to be 
reported independently of the processes by which those outcomes emerge. Closely related is 
then a fourth and final boundary, between the straightforward delivery of evidence and ‘facts’ 
on the one hand, and the iterative, collaborative co-construction of arguments and judgements 
on the other. A bridging of this boundary is clearly at play, for instance, when CSAs speak of 
“working with the grain” (I14, Interview, 21st June 2012) in their interactions with decision 
makers. Both social and material factors are again imbricated in CSAs’ efforts to bridge this 
final boundary, since the effective co-construction of arguments and judgements requires not 
only a distinct communicative approach—one that is collaborative and enables the iterative 
development of ideas—but also the physical proximity and time required to sit down and 
work through issues slowly and carefully, rather than through a series of briefer (or indeed 
remote) exchanges. 
 While CSAs’ management of these four boundaries has much in common with the 
‘coordination work’ observed in Bijker et al.’s (2009, 143) analysis of the Gezondheidsraad, 
there are important differences to be identified. Whereas the Gezondheidsraad bridges 
boundaries between science and politics principally through the rhetorical substance of its 
reports, which seek to provide “well argued reflection on the state of knowledge in relation to 
the state of the world” (Bijker et al. 2009, 142), the individual CSAs in this study frequently 
bridged boundaries using a careful combination of social and material techniques. Moreover, 
the Gezondheidsraad uses its own institutional routines and practices—which themselves 
have important social and material components—to reinforce the concept of a sharp 
boundary between science and politics. By contrast, in our analysis, the perception of such a 




CSAs’ ‘independence’, ‘disinterestedness’ and ‘scientific standing’ as determinants of their 
effectiveness. 
 At one level then, this examination of CSAs supports existing, co-productionist 
accounts of relationships between science and politics in modern democracies (Jasanoff 
2004). Indeed, it suggests that co-production should be embraced not just as a critical 
analytical tool, but also as a positive normative principle. This means going beyond Pielke’s 
(2007) call for experts to operate as honest brokers of policy alternatives, however. More 
fundamentally, we contend that expert advisers can and should reflect with policy makers not 
just on multiple ways of governing, but on multiple ways of knowing too. In other words, the 
efficacy of policy-making processes is at least partly dependent upon acknowledging that 
expert advisors “make judgements on behalf of the common good rather than [act] as 
spokespersons for the impersonal and unquestionable authority of science” (Jasanoff 2005a, 
222). 
 We further build upon existing analyses by highlighting differences in the 
circumstances and mechanisms through which co-production might be realised in practice. 
Specifically, we identify multiple kinds of boundary work involved in co-production, which 
are distinct but interrelated, and might easily be conflated in discussions of advisory 
practices. At one level, therefore, the paper suggests that greater analytical attention can 
usefully be paid to the interplay between these boundaries in different contexts. Going 
further, it proposes that scholars exploring boundary construction and bridging should pay 
greater attention to both the social and the material components of those practices, and to 
their interplay with rhetorical and discursive techniques, in different institutional settings. 
Such work promises not only to advance academic understandings of co-production. Equally 
importantly, it has the potential to enrich public discourse about the nature of (scientific) 




called into question in many spheres, and as policy makers continue to grapple with a wide 
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